Battle of Britain Hawker Hurricane, Supermarine Spitfire, Messerschmitt Bf. 109

Book Code:  SH2588

Battle of Britain Hawker Hurricane, Supermarine Spitfire, Messerschmitt Bf. 109 - Aircam Aviation Series No. S.1

 

The Hurricane and Spitfire, the two main single-engined, single-seat fighter aircraft of the Royal Air Force in 1940, gained considerable fame and an assured place in history for their place in the Battle of Britain. The Spitfire was undoubtedly the more advanced design of the pair, more pleasing to the eye and offering both a higher performance and a greater sensitivity of control than the Hurricane. However, it was not available in anything like the same numbers as the Hawker machine, which, although bearing the brunt of the Battle, was overshadowed in the public eye by its more glamorous stable-mate. A similar situation existed among the pilots of these machines, few people nowadays realising that the majority of the pilots engaged in the Battle were N.C.O.s, and the much more widely publicised officers were in fact in the minority. At the start of July 1940, when the initial phase of the Battle began with German attacks on shipping in the English Channel, both aircraft had already been tested in combat over France, the Hurricane throughout the fighting on the Continent, the Spitfire during the Dunkirk evacuation, and both had shown up well. In July the air defence of Great Britain, in the hands of Fighter Command, was the responsibility of three operational Groups, No. 11 covering the south of England, including London, No. 12 covering the Midlands and No. 13 covering the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. These three Groups had under their command 44 squadrons of single-seat fighters, 19 of these flying Spitfires, and 25 Hurricanes. Twenty-three were within 11 Group, 15 with Hurricanes, and many of those within other Groups were scarcely more than cadre units, reassembling and re-equipping after the withdrawal from France, or newly forming. By early August, when the Luftwaffe launched the first full-scale attacks against the English mainland, striking at radar stations and fighter airfields, the strength of Fighter Command had risen to 47 squadrons, and a new Group, No. 10, had been formed to relieve 11 Group of the responsibility of defending south-west England. This new responsibility Group disposed 7 squadrons, increased a month later to 8, and by the end of September to 9, 11 Group being reduced by 4 squadrons. August was the worst month for the British fighters, attacks on fighter airfields and on the early warning system seriously reducing the number of Pilots available, and by late August the Command had a deficit of over 200 pilots to the establishment. Fortunately Hitler's instructions that the attack of the Luftwaffe should be shifted to London saved Fighter Command and during September new Hurricane units began arriving, the first Canadian, Polish and Czech squadrons going into action. Throughout the Battle squadrons were frequently rotated between Groups, to allow those which had been heavily engaged to rest and recoup. Unfortunately, some squadrons which were ordered to the south were decimated in their early actions, and the more successful units were thrown back into the fighting almost at once. Certain squadrons in the north, particularly those recovering from the French campaign, served more as operational training units, so many of their pilots being posted to bring other squadrons up to strength as soon as they were fully trained, that these squadrons were never able to enter the Battle in their own right. By the end of September, when the German daylight bomber attacks virtually ceased and the remainder of the Battle became a series of fights at high altitude between fighter and fighter.

 

Peter Cooksley & Richard Ward

Softcover 38pp Osprey Publications 1971

 

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